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Abstract 
On 26–29 June 1997, the Austrian Institute for Advanced Studies (Vienna) and the National 
Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies (Washington, DC) co-
sponsored the Third Vienna Dialogue on Democracy on “Institutionalizing Horizontal 
Accountability: How Democracies Can Fight Corruption and the Abuse of Power.” The 
conference sought to address one of the most pressing concerns in young democracies, 
namely how state agencies can prevent other parts of the government from abusing their power 
or, more broadly stated, from becoming unaccountable. After an initial session of exploring the 
historical roots of the concept of horizontal accountability and its theoretical status within the 
comparative study of  democratization, four sessions focused on the following institutional 
fields: judicial systems, electoral administration, central banks, and corruption control 
agencies. 
This report summarizes the presentations and comments made during the conference. Every 
effort has been made to include the most important points made during the discussions, but 
space and organizational considerations did not allow the reporting of every single argument or 
nuance. I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 5 
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Introduction 
Democracy, like so many objects of desire, is a moving target. The contemporary wave of 
transitions from authoritarian rule has swept more countries than ever before to the promised 
land of democracy. But now that these polities have reached democratic shores, often after 
years of intense struggle, they discover that they cannot lean back, relax, and enjoy the 
democratic sun. Instead they find themselves haunted by old demons that they had hoped to 
exorcise through democratic rule: corruption, abuse of power, patrimonialism, and clientelism. 
All these lingering maladies point to one major democratic deficit: the weakness of “horizontal 
accountability.”  
“Horizontal accountability” (a concept developed by scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Richard Sklar) refers to the capacity of governmental institutions including such “agencies of 
restraint” as courts, independent electoral tribunals, anticorruption bodies, central banks, 
auditing agencies, and ombudsmen to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of 
government. (It is distinguished from, and complements, “vertical accountability,” through which 
public officials are held accountable by free elections, a free press, and an active civil society.) 
Today there is a growing awareness that democracy requires governments that are not only 
accountable to their citizens but also subject to restraint and oversight by other public 
agencies. 
Without working systems that can provide “checks and balances” to the overweening power of 
the executive, democratic regimes tend to remain shallow, corrupt, unconsolidated, and 
vulnerable to authoritarian or plebiscitarian styles of rule. 
Setting up autonomous institutions of horizontal accountability presupposes insulating them 
from state officials and from the people as well. Clearly, such institutions may come to clash 
with the principles of vertical accountability. Being unaccountable themselves, agencies of 
accountability are vulnerable to charges that they are undemocratic. Thus it is important not to 
overlook the ancient question: Who guards the guardian? 
Deficiencies of accountability are often more visible, dramatic, and urgent in new than in long-
established democracies. But problems of democratic quality are by no means confined to 
fledgling democracies. The current mood of political disenchantment and cynicism reigning in 
many established democracies may, at least in part, be traced back to serious failures in 
securing public accountability. I nstitutional solutions are always temporary, and institutional 
failures as well as changing social, cultural, political, economic, and technological contexts are 
imposing new imperatives for institutional adaptation and reform even in polities that have some 
history of effective public accountability. 2 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
The conference consisted of five half-day panel sessions. After the first session on the history 
and theory of horizontal accountability, separate sessions were devoted to four critical 
institutional aspects of horizontal accountability: the judicial system and constitutional courts, 
the administration of elections, central banks, and mechanisms of corruption control. One of 
the papers in each of these four sessions focused on the role of international actors, whereas 
the other papers were regional or case studies. The sessions consisted of presentations by 
paper givers, comments by designated discussants, and then a general discussion. Altogether, 
16 p apers were presented. This report attempts to recapture in abbreviated form the most 
important points made by the paper givers, discussants, and participants in the general 
discussion. 
Session I: The History and Theory of Horizontal 
Accountability 
“The Failures of Human Agency: Accountability  
in Historical Perspective” 
Biancamaria Fontana  
Biancamaria Fontana argued that the idea of accountability is rooted in the widely shared belief 
that humans are prone to error. Subjects of political authority should therefore be protected 
from the hazardous behavior of their governors. For a long time, though, the abuse of power by 
rulers w as a secondary problem for political thinkers. Theorists like Hobbes and Locke were 
much more concerned with the question preserving of order and preventing civil war. Even 
though both accepted the right to rebel against a sovereign that is no longer able to protect its 
subjects, and despite the fact that Locke argued in favor of elections, Fontana saw little room 
for mechanisms of accountability in the political philosophy of these two classical authors. 
Even democratic mechanisms of vertical accountability like elections turned out to be 
ineffective in stopping rulers from abusing their power. The reason for this, Fontana contended, 
is the natural tendency of politics towards professionalization. Additional mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability have therefore almost always seemed vital for the correct functioning 
of vertical accountability. Fontana distinguished two approaches in political theory to the 
problem of horizontal accountability. A bureaucratic approach would argue for a control of 
governors by a specialized civil service, exercising control via, e.g., the interpretation of legal 
clauses or the delay of procedures. Fontana also subsumed Montesquieu’s theory of 
separation of powers under this bureaucratic approach: Separate governmental bodies working 
in competition with one another allow more opportunities to detect abuses of power and 
thereby work as a check on other bodies’ tendency to expand their power. A democratic I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 3 
approach, in contrast, would insist that a check on governors is best achieved by popular 
surveillance. O rdinary citizens can operate through special institutions that are at the same 
level as the legislative or the executive in order to control them. 
Fontana adduced as an example the old Athenian People’s Court, in which a random selection 
of citizens judged the legitimacy of legislative or executive decisions. Such a form of 
accountability was democratic, Fontana argued, because it was exercised by ordinary 
citizens; and its horizontal nature was due to the operation of these tribunals as autonomous 
political bodies. Another democratic but still horizontal form of accountability, she maintained, 
are political parties. Despite the danger of corruption and unaccountability to voters, Hume and 
Madison argued, parties have the advantage that they are competitive and visible. 
Today, according to Fontana, the democratic tradition of accountability, either through some 
judicial procedure like the ancient tribunals or through initiatives of popular vigilance, has 
become more and more problematic and ineffective. As a result, calls for the decentralization of 
government arise, which should be interpreted as a desire for more accountability. 
Discussant: Marc F. Plattner  
In his comments on Fontana’s paper, Marc Plattner reflected on the meaning of the word 
accountability. The closest synonym to being accountable, he suggested, is being answerable; 
but this raises the question: answerable to whom? Despite the fact that accountability today is 
generally seen as being closely associated with democracy, it is a morally neutral concept. 
Government officials can also be accountable to a nondemocratic ruler or even to a tyrant. In 
other words, the goodness of the concept of accountability depends on the goodness of the 
regime it is practiced in. 
Plattner then questioned Fontana’s analysis of the contribution Hobbes, Locke, and 
Montesquieu made to the development of the modern notion of accountability. He noted that 
Hobbes, despite being a “notorious champion of absolutism,” also argued in favor of a 
government limited in scope. Plattner especially emphasized the importance of Locke’s 
thought in this context: his doctrine that people have a right to revolt against a government 
violating their trust, and his firm distinction between the legislative and the executive power. 
Plattner’s main conclusion was that the modern notion of accountability is not so much an 
outgrowth of the republican or democratic tradition; rather, it belongs primarily to the liberal 
tradition, which exalts individual liberty, limited government, and the necessity to prevent 
government from going beyond its bounds. 
The general discussion centered around how to define and conceptualize accountability and 
how to distinguish its vertical from its horizontal form. The debate was opened by Philippe 
Schmitter, who argued that horizontal accountability involves actors with more or less equal 4 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
capacities or powers. Schmitter also suggested introducing a temporal dimension of 
accountability. 
Beyond the ex post accountability that Fontana discussed, we should not neglect forms of ex 
ante accountability, whereby decision makers are held responsible for decisions they are about 
to make in the future. 
Participants attempted to list possible dimensions of accountability in general, which could be 
used to distinguish among different types of accountability. Todd Eisenstadt saw two decisive 
dimensions of accountability: to whom an actor is accountable, and from whom the power is 
delegated for which that actor is accountable. Concerning the “to whom” question, Alessandro 
Pizzorno introduced the distinction between being accountable to the present people and to 
the people as a durable entity. The latter idea becomes effective via fixed political procedures 
designed to secure accountability, which are seen as representing the will of the people over 
time. In addition, anticipating a theme of his presentation, Pizzorno pointed to the question of 
the potential consequences (use of force, loss of some identity) of being held accountable for 
some misconduct. 
Finally, Paul Collier asked participants to think about for what some political actor or institution 
is held accountable. In his view, there are two basic alternatives: being held accountable for the 
delivery of public goods or for economic policy regulation. Collier suggested that a trend 
towards the introduction of (quasi-)market mechanisms can be observed in both fields of 
political activity, and with the result that accountability becomes ever more problematic. 
“Horizontal Accountability and New Polyarchies” 
Guillermo O’Donnell 
Guillermo O’Donnell tried to demonstrate that there are three different and partially 
contradictory traditions that “have converged into the institutions and to some extent the 
practice of modern polyarchies”: liberalism, republicanism, and democracy. Whereas forms of 
vertical accountability (like elections, demands on government, media coverage) make a 
polyarchy democratic, horizontal accountability can enhance its liberal and republican 
character. What are the essential features of these traditions? Liberalism emphasizes rights 
and insists on the dualism between the public and the private sphere. This “defensive” 
approach is concerned most of all with preventing the state from interfering in the private realm. 
The public/private distinction features prominently in republicanism as well. But in contrast to 
liberalism, republicanism insists that a proper development of human life can take place only in 
the public sphere through political participation. Republican theories therefore put much more 
emphasis on duties and virtues (especially respect for the primacy of the public good) than on 
rights. Finally, democracy ignores the public/private divide. In addition, it does not consider I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 5 
virtues necessary and stresses only the right to participation, which makes it, at least in its 
pure form, strongly majoritarian. Despite these differences, all three traditions converge in their 
support for some version of the rule of law. 
Horizontal accountability defined as “the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled 
and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that range from routine oversight 
to criminal sanctions or impeachment, in relation to unlawful actions or omissions by other 
agencies of the state is violated in a polyarchy if either its liberal or republican dimension is 
infringed. O’Donnell named two kinds of violations of horizontal accountability: u nlawful 
encroachment by one governmental institution on another, which is against liberal and 
republican principles, and corruption (unlawfully taking advantage of public office for private 
profit), which is above all in conflict with the republican ideal of respect for the primacy of the 
public good. The democratic tradition, in contrast, may be against corrupt behavior because it 
defines authority as sanctioned by the people and exercised for the people and not as rule by 
politicians looking after their private profit. Yet democracy has very little to say about 
encroachment, which O’Donnell considered the more serious danger for new polyarchies. 
The institutionalization of horizontal accountability in a polyarchy cannot, in O’Donnell’s view, 
be brought about by isolated agencies. What is required is a whole network of 
professionalized, well-equipped, and autonomous bodies, with the judiciary at their center, 
cooperating to prevent other governmental institutions from transgressing the limits of their 
formally defined authority. Some of these agencies, like central banks, may even be regime-
neutral in the sense that they could also work in nondemocratic regimes. What may be 
especially helpful for strengthening horizontal accountability through this network of institutions 
are overlapping areas of authority. But the effectiveness of horizontal accountability also 
depends on the existence of various forms of vertical accountability, like the media and social 
organizations. 
Discussant: Richard Sklar  
Commenting on O’Donnell’s paper, Richard Sklar concentrated on the idea of constitutionalism 
inherent in the concept of horizontal accountability. Just like O’Donnell, who saw the point of 
convergence of all three traditions in the rule of law, Sklar did not want to limit the relevance of 
constitutionalism to horizontal accountability only. But he prefered to talk of deep instead of 
vertical accountability, since deep, as a spacial metaphor, implies extension in any direction, 
including “up” to “heaven.” Sklar called this upwardly directed type celestial accountability, 
which is known in the history of political thought as the “appeal to heaven,” or to “the laws of 
nature and of nature’s God.” Constitutionalism, then, invokes celestial as well as horizontal 
types of accountability. Beyond the study of horizontal accountability, Sklar suggested paying 
more attention to the “juristic or metaphysical theory of constitutions manifest in the deep 
commitments of those who have the courage to declare, with celestial fervor, that abuse of 6 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
governmental power is intolerable.” Even though the emergence of persons standing up against 
tyranny escapes  easy systematization, Sklar held that the metaphysical theory of 
constitutionalism is a crucial supplement to structural analysis. 
The general debate opened with Juan Linz’s warning not to separate the democratic from the 
liberal and statist dimension of democracy/polyarchy. Liberal freedoms, the state, the rule of 
law, and a constitution should not be seen as external to democracy but as being presupposed 
by it. Linz also expressed some unease about the focus on horizontal accountability because 
it may lead to a lumping together of criminal abuses of power with violations of political 
responsibility. In his view, the only relevant question in the context of democratic accountability, 
apart from whether or not elections are free and fair, is whether a legislature can hold a 
government accountable for its actions. 
Implicit in any form of accountability in a democracy should be the aim of keeping 
representatives accountable to their electors. Linz therefore warned against putting too much 
emphasis on non-democratic forms of accountability, like courts or independent agencies, 
because they are not accountable to the public. 
Larry Diamond argued that by highlighting notions like networking and overlapping authorities in 
the debate on horizontal accountability some degree of vertical accountability is also invoked. 
Additionally, Diamond reemphasized O’Donnell’s concern that contemporary democracies rely 
too much on liberal forms of accountability. But he stressed that pure democracies, without 
due concern for liberal and republican ideas, may also be very undesirable. 
Philippe Schmitter criticized the liberal practice of looking at the roles of state and non-state 
agencies separately. Networks of agencies trying to secure accountability reach beyond the 
state; they can include strong anti-liberal bodies, like organizations with the power of 
Selbstverwaltung (self-government) found in consociational democracies like Austria. 
Accountability, then, becomes a matter of interpenetration. Schmitter, therefore, advocated the 
use of his concept of partial regimes of a democracy in studying questions of accountability. 
Richard Sklar reminded participants that some forms of accountability may not always be legal 
or prescribed by law. This idea was taken up by Herman Schwartz, who pointed to the example 
of the 1994–96 Republican congress, which, in his view, was very accountable to many 
economic lobbies. Like other participants, Schwartz stressed the need for a mix of democratic 
elements of accountability with elements that are ultimately nondemocratic. This mix should 
be based on a system of constitutionalism in which some highest court watches over the 
enforcement of legislative as well as constitutional norms. And because these norms cannot all 
be assigned to one of O’Donnell’s three traditions, in the end high courts should enforce the 
mix of institutions rooted in different traditions. I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 7 
Session II: Judicial Systems 
“The Judiciary and Democratization in Latin America” 
Pilar Domingo 
Pilar Domingo asserted that the ideal typical description of what a judicial system is all about 
(guarding the law and the constitution, providing a forum for dispute-settlement, administering 
criminal justice) is in sharp contrast with the way most judiciaries in Latin America actually 
work. 
They are widely distrusted because they are considered corrupt, inefficient, clientelistic, and far 
from impartial. They do not safeguard horizontal accountability and are unable, or even 
unwilling, to protect rights in a systematic manner. Finally, Latin American judiciaries are not 
subject to internal mechanisms of accountability and transparency. Numerous forces, however, 
are pressing for judicial reforms in the region, including an increasing variety of domestic and 
international civil society organizations. The strongest demand for an enhanced rule of law, 
however, comes from economic elites, foreign investors, and international financial institutions. 
Their foremost interest lies in strengthening the legal framework of private property. Because 
their bargaining  power is the greatest, Domingo considered non-parallel reforms, whereby the 
legal system is improved only inasmuch as it concerns the economic realm, as quite likely. 
Domingo noted three areas of judicial reform in Latin America: the relation of the judiciary to 
other branches of government; the administration of justice; and equal access to justice for all 
strata of society. The first is of special interest in regard to horizontal accountability. The most 
obvious reason for the lack of political independence of judicial systems in the region is the 
tradition of strong executives dominating the political system. Moreover, Latin America’s history 
of political instability has failed to allow enough time for an accommodation among 
constitutional institutions, has prohibited institutional continuity, and has lead to irregular 
replacements of judges. With only a few exceptions (Chile, Colombia), appointment procedures 
for supreme judges and judicial staff in general are based on clientelism and patronage rather 
than on adequate professional-assessment mechanisms. Finally, Domingo pointed to the 
limited powers of judicial review that leave Latin American judiciaries relatively weak in relation 
to other governmental branches. Nevertheless, the recent trend towards politically more 
independent decisions and the growing enthusiasm for separate constitutional tribunals based 
on the successful Spanish model allow for some optimism for the future. 
Domingo warned against unrealistic expectations for speedy and effective judicial reforms in 
Latin America, given the massive obstacles: strong networks of patronage and clientelism; 
well-entrenched social habits of circumventing the law; executives and legislatures that are 8 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
unwilling to give up control; and judicial personnel that feel threatened by improved 
mechanisms of internal accountability. 
Discussant: Juan Linz  
Commenting on Domingo’s paper, Juan Linz stressed that in the light of rapid population 
growth, urbanization, and other processes of modernization in Latin America, the expansion of 
the judiciary and its functions is unavoidable. This requires an increase of all kinds of 
resources. Of special importance in this respect is a well-trained staff, but this is the one 
resource that is hardest to acquire in the short run. Independence from political influence in the 
appointment of judicial staff is especially important in the context of high-level appointments; 
for lower levels, questions of payment, training, and the like are of higher priority in terms of 
judicial independence. Finally, Linz pointed to the relationship between the judiciary and the 
police, which, in his view, is a subject that requires much more research. 
“Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa”  
Jennifer Widner 
The main focus of Jennifer Widner’s presentation was on how and why judicial independence 
has emerged in African countries with a common law system. Drawing on interviews with 
African judges and lawyers, she came to the conclusion that standard explanations for judicial 
independence (especially those based on group pressures) do not work very well in common 
law Africa. Instead, she stressed the initiative of judges themselves. 
According to Widner, the typical starting point for judicial independence in the region is a 
temporary deal between the executive and the judiciary to make the latter an impartial 
adjudicator. 
The motivations for striking these deals vary. Judges may approach top governmental officials 
in order to secure the rule of law or to retain certain areas of jurisdiction for the courts. Top 
officials, on the other hand, may be willing to confer increased independence on the judiciary 
for reasons such as a desire to distinguish themselves from their predecessors, conflicts within 
the ruling party, or a need to root out corruption. Widner placed strong emphasis on the 
importance of negotiations between top officials and judges, like those between President 
Nyerere and Chief Justice Nyalali in Tanzania, in bringing about agreement on the goal of a 
judiciary that is independent from political influence. 
Once a measure of judicial independence has been obtained, chief justices in the region have 
applied various strategies to strengthen it. Widner grouped them as follows: 1) the improvement I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 9 
of judicial effectiveness via mechanisms to monitor corruption and external interference; 2) 
constituency building, through legal literacy programs, lobbying for a multi-party system, and 
the use of religious symbols to confer legitimacy on courts; 3) the refashioning of jurisprudence 
with the aim of making the rules of judicial interpretation more compatible with local values and 
beliefs; 4) lobbying for laws that are appropriate for the needs of a quickly modernizing society 
and the development of public demands for judicial dispute settlement; and 5) the search for 
alliances with international organizations. 
What is most distinctive about the development of judicial independence in Common Law 
Africa? First of all, Widner stresssed the central role played by judges, which she attributed to 
the absence of economic elites pressing for judicial independence. Second, judges regard the 
public as the central bulwark against encroachments on the judiciary, despite the many 
obstacles to the development of a unified public in those countries (ethnic diversity, 
geographical and technical barriers to communication, alternative traditional authorities, poor 
and rural population with little or no contact with courts). Finally, Widner pointed to the high 
importance that judges attach to jurisprudence. This emphasis on rules of interpretation is 
based on the belief that colonial laws as well as international covenants may be considered 
alien by the people, and therefore have to be reconciled with traditional norms. In addition, 
supreme court judges are convinced that the judicial system cannot be legitimized simply by 
striking down governmental decisions. They also believe in the need to explicate the rules of 
interpretation so that the public can understand what the principles of law-making should be. 
Last but not least, judges view themselves as sources of guiding norms in times of rapid social 
change, which again may help to build up their reputation and a public that is willing to stand 
up to protect judicial independence. 
Discussant: Richard Sklar  
Richard Sklar endorsed Widner’s emphasis on the important role of judges in the 
establishment and defense of judicial independence. In particular, he pointed to the interesting 
parallels that she (as well as the judges themselves) drew between the roles of contemporary 
Chief Justices in Africa and those of their counterparts in the nineteenth century United States. 
Figures such as Chief Justice Nyalali of Tanzania, just like their American predecessors, have 
recognized the importance for judicial independence of professionalizing judicial staff. Sklar 
suggested that in Africa, as in the United States, the quest for judicial independence would be 
directly affected by the quality of training provided by schools of law. Concerning the quest for 
allies or constituencies that  would support judicial independence, he mentioned the natural 
alliance between “lords judicial” and “lords spiritual,” as well as the reservoir of potential support 
from customary court judges despite their rival (reconciliationist rather than adversarial) 
methods of adjudication. 10 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
The general discussion was opened by Herman Schwartz’s critique that neither paper 
considered the influence of the type of law system code versus customary law on the social 
status of judges, which might have an effect on their ability to press for more independence. In 
response, Domingo acknowledged that judges in Latin America are typically held in rather low 
public esteem, but argued that this is a not result of the region’s code law system. Schwartz 
appealed for a more detailed examination of the reasons why judges press for independence: 
Higher court judges could differ substantially in their motivations from judges at constitutional 
courts or from judges at lower levels in the judicial system. 
Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi observed that there seem to be important differences between East 
and West African countries. Whereas Widner presented judges as the driving force behind the 
extension of judicial independence in East Africa, in Ghana it is the bar association. He added 
that judges in Ghana have particularly weak standing vis-à -vis the government: The first and 
only judge that dared to issue a ruling against the government was forcefully removed from 
office in the 1960s. 
Paul Collier stressed the need to look closely at from whom judicial independence is sought. If 
a government is reluctant to grant judicial independence, one should look at the government 
and society in general and not so much at judges in assessing the chances for an independent 
judiciary. In contrast, if a government is committed to making the judiciary independent from 
political influence, the central question becomes how it can lock itself in to reform and close off 
a return to a system of politically dependent courts. The solution to this problem is likely to be 
financial in Collier’s view. Good pay can also help to insulate the judiciary from the corrupting 
influence of litigants. If limited resources do not allow for a rapid increase in overall judicial 
salaries, Collier suggested a strategy of “ring-fencing”: Reforms should start with a core group 
of judges that become the vanguard of a judicial staff complying with the ethical standards of 
the profession. 
“The New East European Constitutional Courts” 
Herman Schwartz 
Herman Schwartz started off by tracing the origins of the European model of separate 
constitutional tribunals on which the constitutional courts in Eastern Europe are based back to 
Hans Kelsen’s draft of the Austrian constitution after World War I. But the true rise of 
constitutional courts in Europe took place after 1945, when the belief that democracy needs 
constitutional justice spread all over the continent. Contrary to Kelsen’s original design, these 
courts have human rights jurisdiction as their basic cornerstone. By 1989 constitutional courts 
could be found almost everywhere in Western Europe; the inclusion of this institution into the 
new democratic constitutions of Eastern Europe was therefore easily predictable. I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 11 
How have the constitutional courts of Eastern Europe worked? Schwartz concluded that the 
success stories are in those countries where a smooth democratic transition has taken place: 
In Poland the constitutional court was set up even before the transition, and in Hungary it was 
an outcome of the Round table negotiations. Both courts have  succeeded in upholding the 
principle of the rule of law, protecting citizen rights, and working as an effective check on 
executives’ aspirations to expand their powers unconstitutionally. Even though in both 
countries the courts’ decisions have sometimes been heavily criticized, their very right to rule 
has never been called into question. The Russian case, in contrast, was described by 
Schwartz as less positive. From 1991 to 1993 the constitutional court issued many well-
reasoned and politically independent decisions and thereby acted as a counterweight to 
President Yeltsin. In September 1993, however, it was dissolved by the president in an 
unconstitutional manner. And even though its institutional standing was only slightly weakened 
under the new constitution, the new court was no longer able to check executive decisions 
effectively because its new members were appointed by Yeltsin precisely for their political 
docility. Other countries with mixed records are Bulgaria and Slovakia. In Bulgaria the 
government led by the ex-communist BSP [sp.out] in 1994 97 quite openly declared war on the 
constitutional court by manipulating itsappointment procedures and cutting salaries and other 
resources. 
Ultimately, however, the court managed to continue to act independently and overturned 
numerous efforts by the BSP-government to reverse reforms. The constitutional court in 
Slovakia has overturned many laws as well, and it is therefore in constant conflict with the 
government of [first name] Meciar. Because the court is highly popular, Meciar by and large 
has complied with the court’s rulings, though often only after some hesitation. Finally, in 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Albania, and to some degree Romania, constitutional courts have more 
or less completely failed to secure political independence. In these countries either 
constitutional judges were chosen on the basis of political patronage, thereby ensuring their 
compliance, or the courts were eliminated from the constitution altogether. 
The lesson Schwartz drew from these examples is that constitutional courts can act 
independently only insofar as they are accepted by other political forces and branches of 
government. This acceptance is most seriously in danger in regimes that are dominated by a 
strong president: “Strong men do not like checks, and often make sure in advance that they 
will not have any.” It can be concluded that presidentialism in a country with a weak democratic 
culture is the most fertile soil for executive encroachments on an independent judiciary. 
“Constructing a European Human Rights Order. The European Court  
of Human Rights” 
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Roger errera’s presentation focused on the history and future prospects of the European Court 
of Human Rights, which has its basis in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In the 47 years since its signing, the ECHR has evolved substantially: the number of the 
contracting states of the convention has multiplied, and 11 protocols have been added; 
moreover, another legal order with another court (the supranational European Union system) 
has been created. Through the interpretation of the Convention by the European Court of 
Human Rights, a common law of human rights has developed. Two principles stand out in this 
respect: First, any restriction of rights must be prescribed by law. This means that the law 
should be accessible and should contain basic guarantees and safeguards. Second, 
restrictions of rights are legitimate only insofar as they are necessary for the protection of a 
democratic society; this means that limitations of rights must be based on a pressing social 
need and should be in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
In terms of the concept of horizontal accountability, it is remarkable that the relationship 
between the European Court of Human Rights and national courts is not fixed but rather is 
characterized by a constant interplay. This is due to the fact that the European Court is not 
comparable to national supreme courts. Some states have incorporated the ECHR into their 
constitutions, but even in these states the European Court of Human Rights has no power to 
enforce a particular interpretation of the convention. After all, the convention is international, but 
its e nforcement is a national matter. Another question is the relationship between the ECHR-
system and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The question of whether or not the European 
Community [Union?] may itself adhere to the ECHR has been answered by the ECJ’s advisory 
opinion of 28 March 1996: no clause of the Rome Treaty gives the institutions of the [EU ?] 
jurisdiction to enact rules relating to human rights or to sign international treaties in this area. 
Errera listed three challenges for the future of the ECHR-system. The first is its reform by the 
11th protocol, which will come into force, after it has been ratified by all contracting states 
(probably in 1998). The second challenge is that of enlargement: with the integration into the 
ECHR-system of a number of Central and Eastern European states, there is a danger that the 
level of rights protection might decrease. A temptation could emerge to apply a less demanding 
interpretation of the Convention to these transitional countries because of the many other 
problems that they face. Finally, the issue of whether or not to incorporate into the ECHR new 
rights, such as equality and nondiscrimination or other social and economic rights, is still an 
open question. 
Discussant: Joseph Marko  
Joseph Marko first pointed to the great variety of competencies including judicial review, the 
protection of human rights, or the banning of certain political parties that may contribute to a 
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court should be the guardian of the constitution and the protector of the rights of minorities. But 
if, as in Austria or in Poland under the “Little Constitution” of 1992, the court’s rulings can be 
overturned by parliament, its basic function is in serious danger. Marko questioned whether a 
strict separation between law and politics can really be upheld, and whether it would not be 
more appropriate to consider constitutional courts as yet another type of p olitical actor. He 
emphasized that this is not simply a matter of common versus civil law because the invention 
of rights by supreme courts can be observed in countries as diverse as the United States and 
Switzerland. 
Marko also raised the issue of judicial impartiality, especially in relation to appointment 
procedures. Schwartz had pointed to Bulgaria, where the constitutional judges are split into 
two groups: reds (close to the ex-communist BSP) and blues (close to the UDF [sp.out] ). But 
the judgments handed down by the court almost never reflected this partisan divide. In fact, 
Schwartz had cited one of the judges as saying, “To think that who appoints us will determine 
how we vote is just naive.” Even judges who were appointed in a partisan manner can develop 
something like a judicial esprit de corps. 
Finally, Marko emphasized the need for building legitimacy for constitutional courts. In his view, 
the institution’s “aura” is the key to this kind of legitimation: constitutional courts have to build 
up some kind of persuasive authority. Most European constitutional judges, as Schwartz had 
indicated, are prestigious law professors who almost never explain their decisions to the public, 
try to speak to the public solely through their judgments, and give no comments on everyday 
political issues. 
Opening the discussion, Juliet Johnson observed that in most cases the legitimation of a 
constitutional court’s power is based on a democratic constitution. But in Eastern Europe, 
Poland being the most prominent case in point, some courts already had been powerful actors 
even before major constitutional change took place. 
Guillermo O’Donnell raised two points. First, he expressed his unease with Schwartz’s 
conclusion that constitutional courts seem to work best where the transition to democracy has 
been relatively smooth; O’Donnell noted that this is not a very comforting finding for young 
democracies that had a hard time transiting from authoritarianism. Second, he argued that, 
with more and more cases being taken to court, Latin America is currently experiencing a 
“juridification” of politics, but this does not necessarily mean that judiciaries play a more 
important role in solving political conflicts. Therefore, a reliable quantitative measure of the 
importance of courts is urgently needed. 
Questions of measurement were also raised by Andreas Schedler who demanded more precise 
criteria for evaluating whether or not a constitutional court can be considered a success story. 
Todd Eisenstadt focused on how to measure judicial independence. He doubted whether the 14 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
number of rulings adverse to the government can be taken as such a measure because it does 
not make much sense when looked at in isolation from the efficiency and quality of rulings. 
Finally, Pilar Domingo asked Roger Errera to elaborate more on the way the ECHR is enforced. 
Errera responded that, of course, the European Court of Human Rights has “no gendarmes” in 
Strasbourg to enforce its rulings and also lacks the power to fine states, unlike the ECJ. The 
main mechanism of enforcement is reputation: states do not want to lose face by losing a case 
at the European Court of Human Rights or, even worse, by not implementing its rulings. How 
judgments from the Court are put into effect differs from state to state, but the standard of 
implementation is high. Most states, after having lost a case before the European Court of 
Human Rights, have enacted new legislation or regulations. Their highest courts have also 
changed their case law. 
Session III: Electoral Administration 
“Institutionalizing Electoral Fairness in Ghana” 
Kwadwo Afari-Gyan 
paper presented by: E. Gyimah-Boadi  
Kwadwo Afari-Gyan’s paper described the reform of the electoral process in Ghana after the 
founding elections of 1992. Because these elections were insufficiently prepared and the 
interim electoral commission was mistrusted, the opposition refused to accept the results of 
the November 1992 presidential elections. This mistrust in the electoral process resulted in the 
boycott of the parliamentary elections of the following month by the main opposition parties, a 
boycott that led to a de facto one-party parliament after the elections. 
To build opposition trust in the electoral process of 1996, therefore, the overall system of 
electoral administration had to be reformed. The most important step in this process, according 
to Afari-Gyan, was the inclusion by the reformed Electoral Commission of all parties in the 
registration of voters and the preparation for and actual administration of the elections. Political 
parties were also involved in planning the electoral reforms via participation in the so-called 
Inter-Party Advisory Committee. With members of the Electoral Commission coming together 
with party representatives to find a common position on how to proceed, this committee played 
a crucial role in building up trust and consensus, despite the fact that its powers were merely 
advisory. Finally, a series of additional measures (transparent ballot boxes, cardboard screens, 
training of election officials and party agents, public education programs, and the 
encouragement of domestic election observer groups) were implemented to make the elections 
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In his presentation of Afari-Gyan’s paper, E. Gyimah-Boadi made a number of critical remarks, 
especially on the Electoral Commission. He noted that, even though the seven members of the 
Commission are appointed for life and are formally independent, the rather partisan manner in 
which the President appoints them on the advice of the Council of State (an a dvisory body 
provided for in the constitution) calls their independence in question. In addition, some degree 
of continuity in mentality can be observed because some Commission members also worked 
in the parent body of the present election authority in the period before democratic rule. The 
second main reason for the limited independence of the Electoral Commission is its w eak 
resource base: The Consolidated Fund provided for in the constitution to cover the 
Commission’s expenses is endowed with only very limited resources, leaving the Commission 
dependent on external donors to a large degree. The commission’s lack of full independence 
led to functional shortcomings. Gyimah-Boadi also criticized the Commission’s inability to 
prevent the government from exploiting its incumbency. In 1996, it could not stop the President 
from addressing the nation after the end of the official campaign. In addition, the Commission 
proved ineffective in enforcing post-electoral accountability, failing to make parties deliver 
reports about the sources and amounts of the money that they spent during the campaign. 
Finally, the Commission’s handling of appeals against electoral outcomes has been too slow 
and ineffective. 
Discussant: Larry Diamond  
Commenting on Gyimah-Boadi’s presentation, Larry Diamond started by asking “accountability 
to what?” to the law or to some principles. Since laws in transitional democracies can be tilted 
towards the ruling party, the international community and the domestic public expect 
accountability to the principle that major public officials should be chosen in free and fair 
elections reflecting “the will of the people”. Freedom in this context should be d efined as 
freedom from intimidation, obstruction, and disenfranchisement as well as freedom to register, 
vote, contest for office, organize political parties, and conduct electoral campaigns. Fairness, 
on the other hand, involves honesty in counting, collecting, and tabulating the actual ballots 
cast and equality for all citizens in access to the ballot. 
These principles cannot be satisfied merely by ex post accountability in the form of 
adjudication of disputes after elections. Electoral accountability, in Diamond’s view, should 
encompass ex ante accountability as well, which refers to a free and fair conduct of the 
electoral campaign. All parties and candidates must have equal opportunities to canvass for 
political support, to raise funds, and to communicate platforms and messages through the 
media as well as rallies and personal contacts. Finally, Diamond emphasized the importance 
of a combination of immediate ex ante (deployment of monitors) and immediate ex post 
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Diamond also recapitulated two key themes relevant to the conference as a whole. First, formal 
political structure matters. For the electoral realm, this means that institutions of electoral 
administration and adjudication must have autonomy and insulation from control by the 
incumbent government and, ideally, from political parties altogether. This can be achieved via 
impartial appointment procedures, sufficient funding, autonomous administration of the funds 
granted, secure tenure in office, training of the staff, and the endowment of these institutions 
with technical and operational capacity. In addition, Diamond stressed the need for 
institutionalized mechanisms to ensure transparency. Whereas accountability is a matter of 
responsibility or answerability to sources, principles, and rules of authority, transparency 
involves openness and accessibility to all potentially interested observers. Transparency in the 
electoral realm, Diamond maintained, is more important than, for example, in the 
administration of a currency by a central bank because free and fair elections are the core 
institution of electoral democracy. If they are to meet the key test of success, namely broad 
acceptability, they r equire the trust of all major electoral factions. In addition, transparency in 
the electoral realm can strongly foster credibility, trust, and mutual security, key components 
of a democratic political culture. 
The second key theme underscored by Diamond was the importance of political will at the top. 
The president or the ruling party must be willing to have fair and free elections, to implement 
the necessary institutional reforms, and to enforce institutional accountability. If this w ill is 
lacking, then pressure for reform and/or the enforcement of accountability has to come from 
civil society and from abroad. Diamond expressed concern that outside pressure and help, 
especially with respect to the threat of aid cuts or sanctions in case of fraudulent elections, 
have been much more lax in Africa, than in Eastern Europe or Latin America. 
“Electoral Justice in Mexico, 1988–1997: Converging Interests of  
Party-State and Opposition” 
Todd A. Eisenstadt 
Since the late 1920s, Mexico has been a n electoral regime, even if quite a repressive one 
toward its independent opposition. Electoral fraud by various means was the norm for decades. 
But since the end of the 1970s, this practice of manipulating elections has given rise to ever-
increasing criticism from both domestic and international actors. In his presentation, 
Eisenstadt described the series of electoral reforms undertaken since that time as the result of 
the interplay of strategies among three “players”: the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), the international community, and opposition parties. 
The PRI started to introduce electoral reforms to give the regime a more democratic 
appearance in the international arena. In 1986, it established the Tribunal of Electoral 
Contention (TRICOEL) as a means of appeasing the opposition and preventing its unification. In I H S — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — 17 
fact, this body was designed as mere window-dressing. Although opposition parties could 
directly nominate magistrates to this tribunal, the TRICOEL had almost no power other than 
that of issuing recommendations to the PRI-controlled, election-certifying Electoral College. 
This lack of influence became especially obvious in the presidential elections of 1988, which 
were characterized by massive and apparent fraud. 
The opposition parties used the TRICOEL (later reformed as the Federal Electoral Tribunal, or 
TFE) as an additional institutional platform for striking deals with the PRI or prolonging tensions 
over electoral disputes that the PRI had wished to silence. The right-wing Party of National 
Action (PAN), a well-organized party with many lawyers in its ranks, changed its strategy in 
the early 1980s by mobilizing against the regime. Its main goal, however, was to negotiate 
agreements with the PRI, seeking concessions, like future election victories and government 
posts in exchange for its support of the PRI’s economic reform policies. Due to its legalistic 
bent, the PAN also managed to file sophisticated complaints at the electoral courts. By 
contrast, the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), with its clientele of peasants, 
the urban poor, and intellectuals, refused to cooperate with the PRI in any respect because it 
considered this a betrayal of the values of the Revolution. Instead, it followed a strategy of often 
violent postelectoral mobilizations at the grassroots. At the same time, it filed complaints with 
the electoral courts and used the outcomes of their proceedings as a basis for negotiations. 
Both strategies contributed to the same outcome: the establishment and constant 
strengthening of electoral courts as mechanisms of post-electoral accountability. Whereas the 
PAN pressed for these courts in direct negotiations with the PRI, the PRD’s bottom-up 
mobilizations threatened to make the regime ungovernable, compelling the PRI to make 
concessions in terms of increased electoral justice. While the PAN is pleased with the 
reforms, the PRD still criticizes the system of electoral justice, especially the procedural 
complications involved in filing a complaint. In any case, Eisenstadt concluded that the TFE 
has become a tribunal with real judicial (instead of mere administrative) powers and has gained 
enough institutional autonomy to ensure at least some accountability. The TFE was even given 
the power to certify elections, but this has not been tested to date in presidential elections. 
Discussant: Andreas Schedler  
In his comments, Andreas Schedler first asked Eisenstadt to be clearer in his definition of the 
Mexican regime: Is Mexico still semi-authoritarian or even  authoritarian, or has it already 
passed the threshold to liberal democracy? In addition, he conceded that international pressure 
might have been the reason for the initial “window-dressing” reforms, but argued that NAFTA, 
for example, was not used by the U.S. to promote Mexico’s transition. Eisenstadt replied that 
international pressure had played an important role in the initiation of electoral reforms as late 
as 1993/94, and had been needed to get the ball rolling in 1989/91. He further insisted that the 18 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
process of negotiating NAFTA had contributed to the establishment of new i nstitutions of 
electoral accountability. 
Schedler then raised doubts about Eisenstadt’s incentive- and interest-based explanation of 
the introduction of institutions of electoral accountability, noting that nearly every Mexican 
development has been explained some time or other by reference to some interest of the PRI. 
Schedler also encouraged Eisenstadt to put more emphasis on ideas, as opposed to interests, 
when looking at the role of opposition parties. He illustrated this by referring to post-electoral 
mobilizations: If they were used by the opposition to gain seats, then it remains to be 
explained why uprisings also took place in cases where the opposition had absolutely no 
chance of winning the race (i.e., where the margin was too big). Eisenstadt conceded that 
competitiveness was not the strongest correlate of post-electoral conflicts; more important was 
the perception by opposition parties that elections were not clean. But he also held that parties 
generally acted according to short-term interests by giving absolute priority to winning the next 
elections and negotiating even small benefits. Schedler acknowledged that mechanisms of 
informal institutionalization have stabilized the electoral regime in Mexico over decades, but 
added that informal institutionalization can have negative as well as positive consequences for 
the democratic quality of a regime: negative if new democratic institutions are set up but do not 
work according to democratic principles; and positive if, for example, a biased electoral law is 
in place, but elections are still basically free and fair. 
Schedler also asserted that the Mexican electoral courts can gain credibility only by ruling 
against the PRI. This may not advance the rule of law and horizontal accountability, however, 
because a PRI defeat in proceedings at the electoral court does not necessarily coincide with 
a properly impartial decision in terms of what the law demands. 
In the open discussion, Pilar Domingo argued that the system of electoral justice in Mexico 
can be endowed with credibility only if the public comes to believe that one day the PRI will 
lose elections. Domingo also questioned the high costs of investments in the Mexican system 
of electoral administration, noting that its budget already exceeds that of the country’s entire 
judiciary. 
O’Donnell offered a conceptual remark on the two papers: a polyarchy is a regime in which 
elections are institutionalized, which involves the expectation that elections will be held again. 
This criterion does not yet allow one to classify Mexico and Ghana as polyarchies. Robert 
Pastor also questioned Mexico’s claim to be a democracy in view of its long tradition of rigged 
elections. He cited the metaphor of “asymptotic democracy”: Mexico and democracy are like 
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Juan Linz qualified the view that the holding of founding elections is the most difficult step 
towards a fully, consolidated democracy. He reminded participants that even after free and fair 
founding elections, a tradition of rigged elections can still have a negative effect through the 
ongoing presence of a machinery of manipulation and especially through a pervasive public 
belief that elections are not really free and fair. It is this belief in the freedom and fairness of 
elections, and not just in their likely recurrence that is imperative for democratic consolidation. 
Second, Linz asserted that while monitoring by external observers can be very helpful for a 
transition to democracy, it should not become a habit, because that would be a sign of lack of 
trust in the democratic process. Robert Pastor urged more attention to NGOs, comparing their 
evaluations of the freedom and fairness of elections with those of electoral tribunals. He also 
asked Gyimah-Boadi whether the international community had contributed to the legitimation of 
illegitimate elections in Ghana. 
Gyimah-Boadi confirmed that this had been the case in 1992, but added that the international 
community had helped to set up and to legitimate the Inter-Party Advisory Committee in 1996. 
Richard Sklar criticized the role of African opposition parties, which often complain about 
electoral fraud even in cases when they alone do not accept the validity of the results. Pastor 
agreed that in many cases, notably in Mexico, the opposition and its strategies were part of 
the problem. In a similar vein, Larry Diamond maintained that it is crucial for the opposition to 
unite to take advantage of the opportunity for a  democratic breakthrough provided by even a 
seemingly biased electoral system. Gyimah-Boadi conceded that the opposition had behaved 
badly in Ghana in many ways, but praised it for protesting vigorously to the broadcasting 
station and the electoral commission in 1996 when the president addressed the nation after the 
end of the official campaign. 
Summing up, Andreas Schedler pointed to the legacy of expectations of partiality resulting 
from a tradition of rigged elections. The central question then becomes how to build up trust. 
The answer, he argued, lies in the visibility of impartial action: Institutions have to be seen as 
acting impartially. This directs attention to the importance of public perceptions and of 
practices like signalling and the use of symbolic behavior. 
 
 
“The Third Dimension of Accountability: The Role of the International  
Community in National Elections” 
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For Robert Pastor contended that the international community provides a “third dimension of 
accountability enhancing vertical accountability by making sure elections are successful and 
strengthening the horizontal axis by calling encroaching institutions to account for their 
actions”. 
The international community could not help to strengthen accountability in new democracies 
so long as the doctrine of non-interference dominated over the principle of free and fair 
elections. But the growing importance of international human rights agreements and the end of 
the Cold War contributed to a redefinition of the notion of sovereignty and to the blurring of the 
boundary between domestic and international affairs. 
Pastor cited three basic preconditions for international actors to be helpful in mediating 
elections: They have to be welcomed by all political actors, informed, and sensitive to a 
country’s basic cleavages. Election monitors should strive for the acceptance of election 
results by all political forces, and this acceptance requires that elections are viewed as fair and 
clean. Monitors should seek to give confidence to parties and voters alike that the vote will be 
safe and accurately counted. They have to mediate between political forces and deter fraud. 
Bringing all parties, even non-democrats, into the electoral process and making them stick to it 
should be the ultimate aim of all their efforts. 
Not all actors are equally well suited to perform these functions. Pastor argued that NGOs are 
more appropriate as election monitors than Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) because 
the latter may be seen as partial. IGOs, on the other hand, can mobilize greater publicity and 
thus make electoral fraud more costly. 
Pastor attributed special importance to the technical side of electoral monitoring. Despite the 
fact that the administrative capacity to carry out elections may be deficient in new 
democracies, any irregularities will invariably be interpreted by some side as politically 
motivated. Monitors should be present during the whole electoral campaign and until the 
transfer of power to minimize the chance that any side will find a reason to challenge the 
electoral results. 
Finally, Pastor warned against limiting the role of the international community to electoral 
monitoring alone. A mechanism of special importance in this respect can be a membership 
requirement of democracy in inter- or supranational organizations, which creates an incentive 
for states to attain and keep a democratic regime. Pastor deemed particularly relevant in this 
context the development of NATO guidelines for the protection of democracy in member states, 
especially in view of NATO’s projected enlargement. 
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Commenting on Pastor’s presentation, Andreas Schedler questioned the conceptualization of 
international accountability as simply a third dimension in addition to horizontal and vertical 
accountability. With regard to Pastor’s three conditions for successful monitoring being 
welcome, understanding the task, and knowing the country he challenged the view that 
protesting vigorously to the broadcasting station and the electoral commission all political 
forces must welcome the monitors, arguing that monitors can build up a reputation of 
impartiality only after they have started working. He also questioned how one could define the 
basic conditions of being welcome. Pastor answered that what really matters is a written 
invitation, so that a disinvitation is not possible without a serious loss of face. 
Schedler also pleaded for greater precision in differentiating the roles to be played by 
monitors/mediators and what he termed enforcers (electoral administration) and reinforcers 
(indirect support) of elections. The critical question in this respect is how these different actors 
build up a reputation. Finally, he noted Pastor’s account of the history of electoral monitoring 
as characterized by discontinuous change and many critical moments, such as the invitation 
of electoral monitors to Nicaragua in 1990. Schedler advocated paying more systematic 
attention to how such critical moments emerge and to how thresholds are crossed beyond 
which progress can be made toward increased democratic accountability. 
Opening the discussion on Pastor’s presentation, Guillermo O’Donnell noted that there is a 
division of labor among NGOs on the domestic as well as the international level that matches 
the distinction between the liberal, democratic, and republican traditions. The liberal tradition is 
represented by human rights groups. Electoral monitoring organizations try to uphold the 
foremost democratic principle, namely elections. Finally, organizations like Transparency 
International have recently begun fighting corruption and other illegitimate transgressions of the 
public-private boundary on the basis of republican values. Herman Schwartz recalled that in 
nearly every country of Eastern Europe international election observers had been present, but 
that their record had been mixed. He contended that the international community has much 
more to offer in supporting democratic development than electoral monitoring, but that the 
international community uses these powers too rarely. For example, the U.S. has foregone the 
opportunity to enforce workers rights and environmental issues with NAFTA. 
Philippe Schmitter proposed two hypotheses about international electoral monitoring. First, if 
everybody wants it, it is of no use. Second, it should not be overused because it works best if 
it is offered least. Pastor rejected the first hypothesis, noting that political actors often invite 
election monitors with a poor understanding of what the consequences will be. (Other non-
democratic politicians, like Carlos Salinas or Fidel Castro, understand the impact of 
international observers quite well, and therefore refuse to invite them.) As to the second 
hypothesis, Pastor replied that where there are strong reservoirs of mutual distrust and a lack 
of consensus on the neutrality of the electoral process, as in Nicaragua and Panama, monitors 
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Richard Sklar stated that it is almost impossible to operationalize the notion of the international 
community. He also pointed to the possibility that international action may in fact be aimed at 
intervention rather than just mediation. John Heilbrunn picked up this theme by asking to what 
extent certain electoral monitors may follow the foreign policies of their home countries. Pastor 
confirmed the occurrence of attempts at using election monitoring for foreign policy purposes, 
but added that in most such instances these monitors are not trusted. He also noted that 
political party institutes have to be very careful to avoid being considered as biased actors. 
Finally, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi asked how the integrity and accountability of international 
observers themselves can be ensured. Pastor responded that key institutions must be 
represented by professional and credible persons, but that it would be wrong to force amateur 
electoral monitors “out of the business.” Pluralism and competition among international 
observers should be seen as a positive thing. 
Session IV: Central Banks 
“Path-Dependent Independence: The Central Bank  
of Russia in the 1990s” 
Juliet Johnson 
Using the example of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), Juliet Johnson sought to demonstrate 
three things: First, besides formal legal autonomy, it also takes political autonomy and 
technical capacities for a central bank to act independently. Second, the belief that the formal 
legal and political autonomy of a central bank necessarily leads to a monetarist policy aiming 
at price stability is theoretically flawed. And third, structural constraints and personalities may 
affect a central bank’s capacity to pursue traditional anti-inflationary policies. 
Johnson described how the origins of the CBR in the Soviet banking system led to high degree 
of formal legal autonomy. This legal independence was granted as a means of demonstrating 
the political independence of Russia at a time when the Soviet Union was still in place. Later, 
during the conflict between president Yeltsin and the Russian parliament, the CBR continued to 
enjoy a high degree of political autonomy because neither of the two sides wanted to allow the 
other control over the central bank. 
But contrary to standard assumptions equating autonomy with anti-inflationary policies, the 
CBR until mid-1993 disbursed credits to economically weak enterprises and tried to secure 
high levels of production and employment. This was due, above all, to the fact that the CBR 
leadership was ignorant of standard economic theory and clung to communist doctrines 
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policies: a staff trained under communism; a lack of standard tools of central banking, 
including a usable payment and clearing system; the fact that 14 former Soviet banks outside 
Russia continued to issue rubles, depriving the CBR of the capacity to control the money 
supply; and the need to fund the government, which had lost most of its traditional revenues. 
Ironically, the CBR started to act as an “ordinary” central bank only after its political autonomy 
was seriously curtailed. This loss of political (though not formal legal) autonomy was the result 
of the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament in 1993 and the ensuing shift in the balance of 
power towards the president. The move towards more monetarist policies was also fostered by 
an increase in technical assistance and training by the IMF and by the end of the ruble zone. 
Nonetheless, the implementation of anti-inflationary policies failed to bring about all the desired 
economic effects because a series of structural problems remained in place. 
Johnson also commented on some issues that had emerged during the conference. She 
challenged O’Donnell’s view that central banks are regime-neutral agencies, arguing that 
central banks cannot build up the credible autonomy that they need under an authoritarian 
regime. She emphasized that a central bank needs at least an independent judiciary from the 
start. Picking up the topic of transparency, Johnson listed four reason why it should also be a 
basic principle for central banks: it helps to generate credibility; it prevents corruption; it 
enhances predictability for economic actors; and finally, it is important for strengthening a 
central bank’s legitimacy. 
“Independence versus Accountability: The Emerging European  
Central Bank” 
Martin Schürz 
Martin Schürz focused on the European Central Bank (ECB) that the European Union (EU) is 
setting up as part of its planned monetary union. He described Germany as the driving force 
behind the institutionalization of the ECB as a copy of the German Bundesbank. Schürz noted, 
however, that the ECB’s legal independence will be greater than that of any national central 
bank; only a revision of the EU Treaty, which would involve the European Parliament as well as 
all the national parliaments, could change its status. According to the Treaty, the primary goal 
of the ECB will be price stability, but it does not determine how this goal is to be achieved or 
what an appropriate level of inflation would be. In addition, the ECB will not be accountable to 
any community institution or national government. 
Schürz found fault with the orthodox tenet that central bank independence leads to low 
inflation. Instead, he argued for an inverse causality: An independent central bank is accepted 
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lies at the heart of the German system. In achieving the consensual goal of price stability, the 
Bundesbank closely cooperates with the government, despite its formal independence. A 
consensus of this kind cannot be expected all over Europe, however. Some countries do not 
share the German aversion to inflation and would rather give primacy to tackling 
unemployment. In this situation, the ECB might be tempted to earn credibility by following an 
exceptionally tough policy. Conflicts with national governments would then be unavoidable, 
which “should be interpreted as indications of inefficiencies in the decision-making process of 
monetary policy and not as favorable signs of the functioning of the independence concept.” In 
case the ECB then fails to explain its policy to the public, the whole system would run into 
serious trouble. 
To avoid this scenario, Schürz proposed measures to strengthen the ECB’s accountability. He 
cautioned against a mechanical transfer of successful national central bank designs to the 
supranational level without making sure that monetary policy will be coordinated with other 
policies. Specifically, Schürz recommended greater influence for the European Parliament and 
the European Council of Ministers of Finance over the choices inherent in monetary policy. 
Short-term tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment should be weighted by elected 
politicians, not by unaccountable central bankers. Finally, the ECB should determinedly follow 
a policy of transparency, issuing a continuous flow of information about its policies, concepts, 
and targets to other institutions and to the public. Even though credibility can only be earned 
through predictable policies over time, transparency can partly serve as a surrogate in the 
beginning. 
Discussant: Philippe Schmitter  
Commenting on Johnson’s and Schürz’s papers, Philippe Schmitter put special emphasis on 
the question of how to legitimate the existence of nondemocratic institutions (or nondemocratic 
guardians of democracy, to use Robert Dahl’s term) that are necessary for the functioning of 
democracy. For some institutions, like armies, central banks, or constitutional courts, 
functionalist justifications can be given. For others, the justification is based on tradition. A third 
kind of justification is political, as when a nondemocratic institution is set up to tie a state to 
some policy in case the current opposition comes to power. The problem is that guardians can 
only work as such if their future behavior is predictable to some degree. As Schürz had hinted, 
this is one of the major problems with respect to the ECB. 
Schmitter pointed to other considerations that make the application of the national central bank 
model on a supranational level problematic. First, if the EU were a nation-state, it would provide 
for compensatory flows of money to certain regions in case of an uneven impact of some 
policy; but in the EU such flows do not exist to a sufficient degree. Second, the EU 
experiences extremely little internal labor movement as compared to the United States, where 
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by a high degree of heterogeneity of preferences. A central bank, however, presupposes 
national political unity, as it cannot continuously act against strong public preferences without 
endangering its autonomy. 
The basic question, then, is how to guard the guardians. Orthodox monetarist theory would 
argue that a central bank does not need mechanisms of accountability, whereas a pure 
republican would hold that accountability is unnecessary where there is a broad societal 
consensus (which was demonstrated to be absent in the EU). It could be argued that 
guardians should guard themselves, but one cannot take for granted that these institutions’ 
internal norms will support the goal of external accountability. More specifically, it must be 
asked how the autonomous ECB can be kept politically accountable. The European Court of 
Justice will not have jurisdiction over the ECB. A governing council would not be an adequate 
counterweight to the ECB in Schmitter’s view; the European Union already has too many 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability, but too few of vertical accountability. The only 
solution, Schmitter concluded, would be the democratization of the EU as such. All things 
considered, he added, the EU is not yet ripe for a monetary union. It’s introduction is extremely 
badly timed. 
In the general discussion, Paul Collier again drew participants’ attention to the most important 
argument in favor of independent central banks, namely the prevention of time inconsistency in 
monetary policy. He noted, however, that while the rule that greater independence leads to 
lower inflation is true for developed countries, this relationship does not hold in less developed 
countries. On the other hand, another rule holds in every context: the longer the tenure of 
central bank governors, the lower inflation. Another critical factor for the independence of a 
central bank may be which persons hold the top positions. Collier pointed to the example of 
five African countries that chose expatriates as central bank governors to increase this 
institution’s independence. 
Finally, Collier doubted that a multinational central bank is intrinsically problematic. He 
admitted that this is the case in Europe, but asserted that taking monetary policy out of 
national politics by establishing a multinational central bank could be the solution for Africa’s 
prevailing problem that central banks lack credibility. 
Robert Pastor asked what has to be added to our stereotype of autonomy to understand how 
institutions safeguarding accountability work. He mentioned such factors as expertise or a 
sense of mission on the part of the persons governing an institution of horizontal accountability. 
Finally, Pastor posed the question whether different stages of national development call for 
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“The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint” 
Paul Collier 
The basic question underlying Paul Collier’s presentation was why the application of conditions 
for the granting of aid (“donor conditionality”) by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has not 
brought about the successful and sustained economic policy reforms that African countries 
require in order to attract urgently needed foreign investments. He started with an analysis of 
the concerns of investors. One is the fear that their investments will create an incentive for the 
government to reverse economic reforms. A second is that a government is not really 
committed to reforms. A third is that there might be policy reversals in case parties or ministers 
in government change. 
What can governments do to reduce these fears? Collier specified two general strategies, both 
aimed at enhancing a government’s credibility. The first he called signalling: a government 
undertakes a behavior that demonstrates its sincereity about reform. The second strategy 
consists in constructing lock-in mechanisms to restrain the government’s future behavior; 
donor conditionality is one such lock-in mechanism. 
In Collier’s view, the problem with donor conditionality to date is that it has tried to constrain 
governments’ behavior  through threatening penalties that lack credibility. The reasons for this 
are manifold: penalizing poor states has no moral legitimacy in the eyes of the Western public; 
it gives penalized governments the opportunity to blame their own incompetence on foreign 
donors; all too often long lists of conditions are applied, so that the violation of only one 
condition leads to the dilemma of either punishing excessively or not punishing at all; and there 
are strong incentives for IFIs not to penalize because it might endanger the whole system of 
lending. Collier also criticized the overburdening of donor conditionality with objectives running 
counter to the IFI’s goal to be an agency of restraint for African governments. Using donor 
conditionality as an incentive for policy change is problematic: it harms the credibility of 
reforms: it creates the image that reforms are bought and owned by the IFIs; it puts 
governments in a position to negotiate against reforms, “selling” as little change for as much 
aid as possible; and it gives them an incentive to make unrealistic promises. By repeatedly 
supporting unsustainable reforms, IFIs have damaged the credibility of governments in the 
whole region, even those that are committed to reforms. 
Collier proposed to redesign donor conditionality to increase its credibility. Donor conditionality, 
he argued, should be employed only to prevent the reversal of reforms. The adoption of reforms 
should be seen as an internal event for which only the respective governments bear 
responsibility. Governments could thereby demonstrate their willingness and capacity to stick 
to reforms. Aid should then be made dependent on what has already been achieved, with only 
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selectively use donor conditionality as a means of rating reforms ex post because private 
investors are interested in what already has been (and not what will be) achieved in terms of a 
stable economic environment. 
In addition, IFIs should refuse to enter deals of donor conditionality with too severe penalties or 
with penalties for a reversal of reforms in highly controversial policy areas. Finally, African 
countries should use global or regional trade groups, like the WTO or the EU, as external 
agencies of restraint by locking themselves in to reform in return for access to their markets. 
Discussant: Philippe Schmitter  
Philippe Schmitter distinguished political from economic conditionality. The latter makes aid 
dependent on the implementation of some economic policy and demands a binding of 
governments’ future behavior. Political conditionality, on the other hand, aims at making a 
regime more democratic. In many real world cases, however, political conditionality is limited to 
a one-off certification procedure, as in the case of admittance to the Council of Europe, so that 
future deteriorations of democracy in a country remain unsanctioned. Thus, the international 
community relies more on signals from governments than on locking them in to democratic 
politics. This shying away from the use of lock-in mechanisms as a means of promoting 
democracy may be rooted in the view that they are undemocratic because they exclude certain 
matters from democratic decision-making. 
To make democracy promotion more effective, Schmitter proposed to redesign political 
conditionality in such a way as to reward good bahavior rather than to punish bad behavior. 
Therefore, following Collier’s rule that aid cannot buy reforms, one should wait for prior internal 
democratic reforms and reward ex post those countries that did best. In particular, countries 
should not be granted membership in international organizations before they achieve some 
democratic standard, and they should be expelled in case they do not comply with predefined 
standards of democracy. In general terms, countries should be given only rewards that can be 
removed again. 
Schmitter argued that political conditionality should precede economic conditionality, whereas 
with Eastern Europe the reverse was the case. He also observed that there is a competition 
among suppliers of conditionality, especially when it comes to political conditionality. One 
should take into account that there is no single actor called the “international community.” 
Referring to Schmitter’s comment on the nondemocratic character of lock-in mechanisms, 
Larry Diamond remarked that pure democracy may not be desirable anyway. In the same 
context, Juan Linz noted that by adopting democratic constitutions the actors i nvolved do 
exactly what has been described as being undemocratic: they lock in themselves and future 
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political decisions is a way of locking politics in. Jennifer Widner also defended allegedly 
“nondemocratic” lock-in mechanisms, insisting that the lock-in mechanism of granting rights is 
unavoidable if the holding of elections is to be secured. 
Robert Pastor pointed out that if a policy benefitted everyone it would be implemented anyway. 
Therefore he asserted that the real problem for the credibility of donor conditionality, redesigned 
or not, is what prevents a government from changing its mind after it has been locked in. 
Finally, Guillermo O’Donnell asked whether the mechanism of locking in governments to reform 
is regime-neutral. Collier replied that it is impossible to lock in dictatorships, which cannot bind 
themselves due to the fact that this would require them to shed some authority. 
Session V: Corruption Control 
“Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Africa” 
John R. Heilbrunn 
Discussing anti-corruption measures in five African countries, John Heilbrunn distinguished 
three potential strategies for fighting corruption: legislation, the establishment of independent 
agencies, and reliance on control by NGOs. In Botswana, high growth rates allowed the 
government to endow its anti-corruption directorate with a relatively large budget, whereas the 
anti-corruption commission in Tanzania still suffers from low salaries and a shortage of funds. 
In Senegal a legislative anti-corruption strategy proved ineffective because of the country’s 
many religions and languages. Anti-corruption campaigns in Cote d’Ivoire, under both autocracy 
and democracy, turned out to be directed more against political rivals than against corruption 
itself. All in all, the francophone countries relied almost exclusively on legislative strategies, 
while the anglophone countries backed up legislation with anti-corruption bureaus. In Benin, the 
principal focus of Heilbrunn’s paper, corruption contributed to the economic collapse of 1989, 
subsequently leading to the transition to democracy in 1990. Even though the new democratic 
government under [fisrt name] Soglo initially pursued economic reforms and anti-corruption 
campaigns quite successfully, Soglo later was accused of corruption and nepotism himself. 
The result was his defeat in the presidential elections of 1996. 
Two special institutional features stand out in Benin’s fight against corruption. The first is the 
five National Conferences (or États Généraux) that have taken place since 1990. At these 
conferences all kinds of corporate groups discussed themes of broad public importance 
(reforms of the territorial administration, the civil service, the judiciary, and the economy) and 
developed recommendations to the government. These conferences attracted strong public 
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conflicts, and contributed to the definition of political institutions. Corruption was discussed at 
one point or another at all these conferences. Heilbrunn concluded that, even though no 
specific measures were proposed, the conferences were crucial for sharpening the public’s 
attention to problems of corruption and accountability. 
The second institution of interest in this context is the so-called Presidential Commission for 
the Improvement of Moral Standards in Public Life. Its tasks include the investigation and 
prosecution of corruption and education about its consequences. Among the factors 
responsible for the commission’s relative success were having its own budget and the non-
partisan nature of its members. Heilbrunn drew special attention to the role of civil society: the 
commission was broadly supported by the public, by business leaders, and especially by the 
media. 
“Combatting Corruption in Asia: Comparing Anti-Corruption Agencies in 
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand” 
Jon S.T. Quah 
Comparing anti-corruption measures in three new Asian democracies, Jon Quah concluded 
that the basic problem in all these countries is still the inadequate remuneration of civil 
servants. This is most obvious in Thailand, the biggest and poorest of these three countries. 
According to Transparency International, corruption is also a much more widespread and 
serious problem in Thailand than in South Korea or Taiwan. Thailand’s Commission of Counter 
Corruption, whose origins date back to the 1970s, was described by Quah as relatively 
unsuccessful in curbing corruption. This is reflected, for example, in the persistent practice by 
public o fficials of setting aside ten percent of provincial budgets for their own purposes, a 
practice the Interior Ministry knows about but is unable to root out. 
In South Korea, which has been described as the “Republic of Total Corruption,” mostly 
inefficient attempts to get rid of corruption also have a long tradition. In 1992, Kim Young Sam 
won the presidential elections with a campaign promising anti-corruption and pro-transparency 
measures. 
He thereby seemed to put an end to the tradition of a lack of political will at the top in fighting 
corruption. Kim introduced two new agencies: the Board of Audit and Inspection and the more 
analytically oriented Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. Recently, however, trust in 
the president’s willingness to counter corruption was seriously undermined by a scandal 
involving his son. 
Finally, Taiwan is plagued primarily by two forms of corruption: vote-buying and bribery and 
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researched in Taiwan, the evidence presented by Quah suggests that the Anti-Corruption 
Department set up inside the Ministry of Justice in 1989 has been relatively successful. A mix 
of measures have proven effective, including investigations; severe punishments for vote-buying 
and extremely high rewards for reporting it; the education of the public and its encouragement 
to report all kinds of corruption; a revision of electoral laws; and the urging of parties  to 
nominate clean candidates. 
Discussant: Juan linz  
Juan Linz began by suggesting that Heilbrunn and Quah placed too little weight on the analysis 
of different types and forms of corruption and the different kinds of counter-strategies that they 
call for. He suggested that the analysis of the kinds of measures required for rooting out 
corruption at the highest level had been especially neglected. 
Linz argued that more systematic attention should be given to the relationship of 
democratization to corruption. Democracy generates not only opportunities to improve anti-
corruption measures but also incentives for corruption in the competition for power. Linz also 
touched upon the question of corruption’s social basis. Of special importance, he asserted, is 
a culture of particularism, which leads to a system of doing favors for family members and 
friends and to social transactions that strongly privilege them. Particularism often breeds forms 
of corruption that do not involve monetary transactions, what makes them less usable and 
predictable for outsiders. 
Finally, Linz questioned whether corruption at lower levels can be fought effectively in poor 
societies lacking the resources to increase the salaries of civil servants. Linz drew attention to 
a possible anti-corruption model, in which particular sectors of the civil service dealing with a 
lot of money are linked with a system of fees that have to be paid by applicants. These fees 
would first go to the state but would then be redistributed in some way to civil servants to 
improve their pay. Linz concluded that a system of “universalized bribes” of this kind would 
create a particular form of incentive for civil servants not to take bribes for themselves but to 
collect it for the benefit of all. As an example of such a model, Linz cited the patrimonialized 
bureaucracy in Spain during the late Franco era. 
In the discussion, Michael Johnston contended that economic growth is essential to anti-
corruption reforms, not only because it increases state resources available for raising civil 
servants’ salaries, but also because it provides people with economic alternatives so that they 
are not dependent on exploiting a job in the public administration. (The lack of alternatives was 
illustrated by Quah with the example of Myanmar, where people pay to get a job in the 
customs department, where the highest bribes are paid.) Second, Johnston argued that growth 
can lead to a decrease in corruption only insofar as markets are institutionalized and a 
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does growth work against corruption, but corruption also has a negative impact on growth. 
Jennifer Widner observed, however, that there is no association between rates of growth and 
the level of corruption in Africa. A reason for this might be that economic liberalization simply 
leads to changing patterns of corruption. 
Fredrik Galtung called attention to the East Asian paradox of high growth rates with high levels 
of corruption. He explained this by a lack of political will to curb corruption: All too often new 
anti-corruption institutions are not backed up by credible political leadership. Galtung also 
mentioned a second paradoxical case, namely that of Japan, where the bureaucracy is clean 
even though the salaries of civil servants are comparatively low. 
Larry Diamond questioned whether high salaries alone could deter corruption when vast 
amounts of money were under the discretion of public officials. In such a situation, Diamond 
argued, credible penalties are also needed to make anti-corruption efforts effective. Quah 
supported this point, arguing that raising salaries can only be one step in a whole package of 
measures aiming at making corruption a high-risk low-return practice. He added, however, that 
high salaries can at least prevent a brain drain of skilled civil servants. 
Diamond also stressed the importance of political culture for explaining corruption. He detected 
a strong dose of republicanism in Singapore and Hong Kong, which makes it possible for them 
to control corruption despite the lack of democracy. Africa, in contrast, has no such political 
culture, so the introduction of elections does not automatically lead to effective anti-corruption 
measures. The key in such a situation, Diamond argued, is top-level political commitment. As 
a case in point he cited Botswana, where a political will to curb corruption has been present 
since independence. Corruption control in Botswana preceded economic growth and was an 
important precondition for it. In many cases, however, political parties will not have an incentive 
for anti-corruption measures because they may be involved in corruption themselves to finance 
democratic competition. A vigorous civil society can play a pivotal role, massively mobilizing for 
the institutionalization of credible institutions of corruption control. Heilbrunn added that the 
causality can also be reversed: The implementation of anti-corruption measures may become 
possible only after credible leadership has mobilized public support against conservative forces 
trying to protect the system. 
Robert Pastor drew attention to the dilemmas involved in measuring corruption. Do we interpret 
a high rate of arrests of corrupt bureaucrats as a sign of effective anti-corruption measures or 
as an indicator of high corruption? And how do we avoid being fooled by policies such as the 
“displaced harassment” practiced by former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. General 
Noriega struck a deal with certain Colombian drug cartels to go after their rivals. While it looked 
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Finally, Juan Linz raised the question of why electorates regularly forgive political parties for 
their corruption. Even in the West, opposition to corruption does not mobilize much support, 
which may be explained by the fact that ordinary voters themselves are not as clean as 
mainstream democratic theory assumes. Heilbrunn responded that it may simply be the 
leadership ability of certain politicians that leads people to be forbearing. This was probably the 
reason why Benin’s former dictator [first name] K‚r‚kou was voted back into office again in 
1996. Quah added that it may also be a matter of culture. In Thailand, for example, people are 
tolerant of corruption as long as there is not a huge amount of money involved. 
“Representation, Corruption and Circles of Control: the Case of  
“Mani Pulite” in Italy” 
Alessandro Pizzorno 
Alessandro Pizzorno began by pointing to a universal trend making representative institutions 
weaker and judiciaries more powerful. Due to internal and international constraints, legislative 
regulation has become less effective, and more and more interest groups simply pass 
representative institutions by. The constant expansion of the weight of the judiciary, by contrast 
has been induced by a trend away from regulatory toward society-changing laws, leading to 
greater emphasis on rights and their protection by courts. The judiciary has gained 
discretionary and even law-making authority because it has to interpret laws that are becoming 
ever more detailed and ever more vague. The vast expansion of procedural rights has led to a 
situation in which “access to judicial mechanisms comes to be seen as more efficacious than 
access to politically representative ones.” Pizzorno argued that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the political environment in which the Italian judiciary developed its drive to control the 
party-dominated political system was not one of “polarized pluralism.” Instead, Italy had 
experienced “semi-consociational” cooperation among all political parties at all levels of 
government for quite some time. Even though the left was not in government, it was strong 
enough to influence political decisions. By the end of the 1970s, the judiciary had attained the 
formal legal autonomy it still enjoys. Both its adjudicating and prosecuting branches are self-
governing and therefore free from political influence. Its discretion over whom to prosecute is 
uncurtailed (opening u p the danger of “invasive magistrates”), and its promotion system is 
determined exclusively by principles of seniority. A new generation of magistrates has been 
guided by an ideology of “vicarious opposition” (substituting itself for the missing political 
opposition). But this ideology was not, as Pizzorno emphasized, a leftist one. All political 
strands were represented among the magistrates, but in the end their political affiliations had 
no influence on their actions. In short, professional solidarity ruled. 
Yet the judiciary did not draw its power merely from its formal independence and its internal 
coherence. Probably just as important was the broad public support it received, based on its 
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led to an inversion of roles. The judiciary, and not the parliament or the government, was seen 
as the real representative of the public will. As a result, the political branches were 
unsuccessful in trimming the powers of the judiciary. Pizzorno added that the public opinion as 
an informal and external mechanism of control not only reigned in representative institutions 
through its support for judicial action (the formal external mechanism of control), but also quite 
directly applied sanctions like the loss of reputation. These sanctions were so serious that 18 
persons prosecuted by the judiciary committed suicide. 
“Developing Agencies of Restraint in a Climate of Systemic Corruption – 
The National Integrity System at Work” 
Fredrik Galtung 
Fredrik Galtung devoted his oral presentation to a discussion of Transparency International (TI), 
an international NGO dedicated to combatting corruption. TI was founded in 1993 as corruption 
was becoming one of the most discussed issues worldwide. Galtung listed many reasons for 
this increased interest in the topic. First, there is evidence that corruption really has gotten 
worse. 
Second, economic globalization has led to increased foreign investment in countries with 
serious corruption problems. Moreover, processes of democratization have contributed to a 
growing awareness of corruption worldwide. Finally, after the end of the Cold War and the “end 
of ideology,” superpowers no longer support corrupt dictatorships for strategic reasons, and 
their misdeeds can now be discussed more openly. 
TI was originally planned to be an intergovernmental organization, but in the end it was 
established as an NGO in Germany. Even though half of its budget comes from governments, 
they do not exert influence over its work. Although at first TI planned to deal solely with 
corruption in international business, it soon became clear that its focus had to be expanded. 
Galtung described TI’s work as being more concerned with prevention than investigation. 
The aims of TI are as follows: assisting and developing national integrity systems, lobbying for 
more anti-corruption programs internationally, and raising public awareness. Galtung contended 
that TI has been especially successful with respect to this third goal. TI attracted considerable 
public attention with its Corruption Index, based on surveys among international businessmen, 
which ranks countries according to their level of corruption. Galtung argued that the results of 
the index have influenced some of the countries being criticized. The government of Malaysia, 
for example, put advertisements in newspapers urging foreign investors to report corrupt 
practices to the national anti-corruption agency, whose budget it also increased. In Pakistan, 
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Benazir Bhutto declared that the country was free of corruption; two weeks later Bhutto was 
forced to resign (though Galtung did not claim this as a success for TI). In 1997 a second index 
will be published, dealing with the sources of the money used for bribery. Thus the clients and 
not just the principals (state) and agents (civil service) involved in corrupt transactions will also 
be criticized. 
Discussant: Michael Johnston Discussing both presentations, Michael Johnston emphasized 
that the sequencing of anti-corruption strategies matters. Most anti-corruption measures 
presuppose that certain mechanisms of horizontal accountability are already in place. In 
designing these strategies, however, one should not always take for granted the proper working 
of the rule of law. Implementing a proper mix of anti-corruption strategies in a particular country 
at the right time is therefore crucial. 
Johnston also cited the role of political competition, which he acknowledged can produce 
incentives to become involved in corruption as well as incentives to root it out. A lack of political 
competition, however, usually leads to an increase of corruption. Therefore, efforts to pluralize 
political forces are also a step towards decreased corruption. Finally, Johnston picked up the 
theme of the relationship between democratization and corruption, noting that mobilization 
against corruption may be a very useful vehicle in the fight against a nondemocratic regime 
because it allows opposition forces to challenge the regime without attacking it directly. 
Guillermo O’Donnell called for more systematic research on the role of different types of media 
in the fight against corruption. He argued that a reasonably free press is a precondition not only 
for democracy, but also for any effective anti-corruption strategy. One problem in this respect is 
that when politicians are already strongly mistrusted, the public’s attention span for revelations 
of new scandals will be very short, and corruption may have no influence on voting decisions. 
On the other hand, there is the danger of trials in the media, or of corrupt journalists using their 
position and knowledge to blackmail politicians. 
O’Donnell also posed the question of how to define corruption in a culturally neutral way, given 
that some practices are considered corrupt in one society and perfectly admissible in another. 
The problem of where to draw the empirical, as well as normative, line becomes especially 
urgent in societies where helping one’s (extended) family is a strong obligation. Speaking as 
an activist (rather than a social scientist), Galtung responded that a campaign against 
corruption can proceed without a clear consensus on accurate definitions. He added that, 
despite the fact that there may be cultural origins of corruption, cultural arguments all too often 
are abused for defending corruption in the face of external criticism. 
Finally, Jennifer Widner urged going beyond mechanisms of policing and prosecuting corruption 
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anti-corruption campaigns. For example, she noted that most people simply cannot take a 
case of corruption to court because they have no money. Another obstacle to effective 
prosecution may result from a country’s legal system. In common law systems, prosecution is 
possible only if accusations are presented to the court, and some cases may not be brought 
forward because of fear of a libel law. 36 — Harald Waldrauch / Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability — I H S 
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